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A REPLY TO PROFESSOR KIRGIS
JamesA. Martint
Traditionally rejoinders are marked by brevity and praise of
the opposition. I will adhere to both traditions. One is always
pleased that his writing has been read; one is doubly satisfied to
discover that it has merited response. When the response is as
able as that of Professor Kirgis,' the original author is thrice
blessed-and a little apprehensive.
Professor Kirgis and I disagree on two points: (1) the proper
constitutional basis for limitations on state choice-of-law rules, and
(2) the proper standards for such limitations. My Article 2 suggested
that the traditional position on the first issue-that due process
supplies the constitutional limit for a state's conflicts rules-is not
analytically supportable. I suggested that the full faith and credit
clause supplies a more logical basis for limitation, since full faith
and credit analysis emphasizes deference to the interests of other
jurisdictions.
My argument took Home Insurance Company v. Dick3 as a model.
I argued that the Texas statute in question, which limited the
power of contracting parties from shortening the statute of limitations by agreement, was not unfair in vacuo. Therefore, Texas
could fairly apply the statute even when there was very little connection between Texas and the transaction. That we intuitively
bridle at such an imposition of Texas law does not mean that fairness is the issue. I argued that a decent deference to the interests
of the other jurisdiction (Mexico, in this case) would explain intuitive agreement with the result of the Dick case. Such deference
to the interests of other jurisdictions traditionally rests on full faith
4
and credit notions.
t Professor of Law, University of Michigan. B.S. 1965, University of Illinois; M.S.
1966, J.D. 1969, University of Michigan.
1 Kirgis, The Roles of Due Process and Full Faith and Credit in Choice of Law, 62 CORNELL
L. REV. 94 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Kirgis].
2 Martin, ConstitutionalLimitations on Choice of Law, 61 CORNELL L. REv. 185 (1976).
3 281 U.S. 397 (1930). The facts of that case are summarized by Professor Kirgis at
Kirgis 97-98.
" Mexico is not a state for purposes of the full faith and credit clause. I argued, however, for reasons not here relevant, that the conflicts cases involving foreign states should
be governed by the same principles applicable to cases involving only states of the United
States. Martin, supra note 2, at 199-200.
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Professor Kirgis seems to agree with my analysis insofar as it
disposes of fairness as the fundamental rationale for the result in
Dick. He differs by suggesting that, in addition to fairness and
procedural regularity, due process has another component: the
limitation of state power. As examples of this power-limitation
principle, he cites cases imposing limitations on a state's taxing
power 5 and personal-jurisdiction cases 6 in which due process furnished the basis for decision. I will not elaborate here on my earlier
discussion of the relationship between limitations on choice of law
and limitations on personal jurisdiction, but will address a few
words to the issue of the state's taxing power.
I agree that the proper limitation on a state's power to tax
derives from the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
I do not believe it follows, however, that a general limitation-ofpower principle, inherent in due process, applies in resolving
private disputes. In the tax area there are two adversaries: the state
and the taxpayer. States seldom have an interest in limiting the
power of another state's taxation of individuals. 7 Thus, full faith
and credit seems inapposite. On the other hand, fairness is quite
relevant. It is notfair for the Soviet Union to tax a cottage industry
in downstate Illinois selling only to local buyers. It is not fair for
Illinois to tax a local worker in Irkutsk. Our sense of fairness leads
us to expect the possibility of a quid pro quo for our tax dollars.
Moreover, we question the fairness of a sovereign that both imposes a tax scheme and adjudicates its applicability to particular
situations. The opportunities for overreaching are great, so the
rules limiting the sovereign's power must be drawn with fairness
very much in mind.
I would argue that the tax cases do not demonstrate that the
limitation of state power is an independent component of due process. Unlike the Dick case, the tax cases can be explained in terms
of fairness. If there is an element of due process that limits a state's
power to apply its own presumptively fair law, it originated in the
5 National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753 (1967); Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959); Miller Bros. Co. v.
Maryland, 347 U.S. 340 (1954); Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435 (1940); Aldens,
Inc. v. Packel, 524 F.2d 38 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub nom. Aldens, Inc. v. Kane, 425 "U.S.
943 (1976); Griffin, Inc. v. Tully, 404 F. Supp. 738 (D. Vt. 1975), prob. juris noted, 424 U.S.
907 (1976). See the discussion in Kirgis 96 nn.6 & 7.
6 Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310 (1945). See the discussion in Kirgis 96 n.5.
In a few cases, of course, states would have such an interest if the assets of the taxed
person were inadequate to satisfy all the state's tax claims.
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very cases discussed in our two Articles. I disagree with the reasoning of those cases. In contrast to the development of such an ad
hoc role for due process, alien to its traditional role, the full faith
and credit clause readily supplies a consistent rationale for conflicts cases.
What difference does it make which rationale guides the exercise of state power in conflicts cases? In a sense it does not matter.
The argument is as idle as the infamous dispute on the terpsichorean talents of angels. My preference for the full faith and credit
approach arises from two peripheral considerations: (1) the approach avoids distorting the law of due process which has developed outside the conflicts area; and (2) it focuses on the interests
of states other than the forum, as due process does not. This latter
focus is so essential to current choice-of-law thinking that any theoretical framework for limiting choice-of-law rules that ignores it
is almost per se inadequate.8
The results of cases are what ultimately matter. The important issue, then, concerns the standards for deciding future
cases-the ones that we can still do something about. In this respect
Professor Kirgis and I are not at odds. He proposes more detailed
standards than I and asserts that my standards are too vague. I
agree that in general briefer statements of the applicable standards
make their application more difficult. But greater detail does not
guarantee easy application; witness part (c) of Professor Kirgis's
second standard, which calls for a court determination when "the
severity of the forum rule is all out of proportion to the benefit
derived from the forum by the affected party."9 I do not quarrel
with that standard, but it is not clearer than my own standards.
In discussing specific examples, Professor Kirgis and I reach
the same results on all but one of the hypothetical cases: the application of the New York no-fault insurance law to out-of-state drivers with out-of-state insurers."' I admit that I am uncomfortable
with the result that I reach in this case. It bothers me more, however, that New York could alter the terms of a contract made by
two non-New Yorkers, simply because one of them committed a
tort within the state. Two points stand out in my mind: (1) I find it
s Current choice-of-law thinking postdates the first of the cases raising the due process
framework for constitutional limits. But even those cases are recent, and one of the original
purposes of the full faith and credit clause related to limitations on choice of law. B.
CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 197-201 (1963).
' Kirgis 104.
'1d. at 129-30.
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hard to justify New York interference with an insurance contract
that has virtually no connection with the state; and (2) I believe
that Professor Kirgis's own standards point in the same direction
as mine do.
Professor Kirgis identifies three New York interests in this
hypothetical case: (1) decongestion of New York courts by reducing automobile accident litigation through the destruction of tort
liability; (2) speedy provision of payments to medical creditors; and
(3) nondiscriminatory treatment of injured motorists regardless of
the state where they reside or where their insurance was issued.
But the first interest is inapplicable. New York courts are no more
congested if tort liability is denied without imposing liability on the
insurer of the out-of-state injured driver. Consideration of New
York's interest in providing for its medical creditors is appropriate
only if the insurance company's liability is assumed. Provision for
medical creditors from proceeds of a totally out-of-state contract
that does not give any right to those funds is at worst perverse and
at best unjustified without a better reason for interfering with the
out-of-state contractual relationship. The third interest, of nondiscrimination, is applicable only if New York's refusal to interfere
with an insurance contract with which it has no connection is
considered discriminatory. But New York does not discriminate
among drivers by applying law that is otherwise applicable to their
insurers.
Professor Kirgis also notes that the insurance company derives
a benefit from the motorist's peregrinations in New York, thereby
satisfying his standard of derived benefit, suggested in part 2(a) of
his rules.'1 This notion is simply untenable. If I bet with my neighbor that life on Mars exists, my benefit (or loss) is not "attributable"
to some hypothetical Martian government, giving it the right to
declare the bet void on Martian public policy grounds or to alter
the terms of the bet. Even if my friend is a future astronaut, the
benefits from the wager entered into here are not attributable to
Mars. Insurance contracts are essentially wagering contracts of this
sort between an insurance company and the insured: if you are
held liable where you travel, the insurance company agrees to pay
any judgment that someone obtains against you. The New York
law rewrites that contract to say that the insurance company must
pay the insured, not for the insured's liability (basing calculations
11Id. at 10a.
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for their likelihood on the insured's driving record), but rather for
the insured's injuries (which are just as likely to be the result of
someone else's driving abilities). If I were an insurance company, I
would search in vain for the benefit that I derived from New York
under such an arrangement.
The rational solution to such a problem-given that New York
has abolished tort liability-provides the parties with litigation in
the state of contracting. The courts of that state may then appropriately modify its insurance law to provide for the situation in
which the state of the accident has abolished tort liability.
There are many things left to say-a defense of my use of
Skiriotes v. Florida2 and Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 13 for
example-but the main points have been made: Professor Kirgis's
distinction between due process limitations and full faith and credit
limitations is consistent with expressions in the case law, but it is
that distinction that I intended to attack in the first place. I see,
somewhat greater utility (including logical consistency) in adhering to a full faith and credit analysis, but put more emphasis on results. To the extent that Professor Kirgis's tests provide more
useful detail than mine, I welcome them. Even where we disagree
on one specific case, I find support for my position in his standards. Whatever our differences, however, they cannot mask the
value and rigor of his Article, and I am honored to have furnished
the catalyst for it.
U.S. 69 (1941).
376 U.S. 398 (1964).
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